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Abstract—One problem with most currently used transaction
authentication methods is that they depend on the customer’s
computer for integrity of the information ﬂow between customer
and bank. This allows man-in-the-middle attacks to be conducted
using malware for ﬁnancial fraud. Some banks are implementing
new authentication methods that allow customers to verify trans-
actions received by a bank without depending on the customer’s
computer to provide information integrity. These new methods
are more complex compared to traditional authentication meth-
ods and need the customer’s attention to be effective, since it is up
to the customer to verify the information that was received by his
or her bank. By examining the intrinsic problems of traditional
and new transaction authentication methods as used by banks, we
designed an alternative authentication method named ’Entered
Single Transaction Authentication’. Our method ensures that the
bank receives information as the customer entered it without
requiring further veriﬁcation by the customer. We introduce the
concept ’What You Enter Is What You Sign’, which ensures
the digital integrity of information as soon as it is entered.
Our proposal is theoretical and high-level, but opens the way
for secure transaction authentication methods that rely less on
the authenticating party to provide correct information, thereby
reducing errors and improving user friendliness.
Index Terms—transaction; authentication; online banking
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of online banking continues to grow in many
countries. For instance, in the European Union the use of
online banking by individuals aged 16 to 74 increased from
25% in 2007 to 42% in 2013.1 Examples of growth in
individual countries where Internet banking is being used by
a large part of the population include the Netherlands (65%
in 2007 and 82% in 2013) and Denmark (57% in 2007 and
82% in 2013). Opposite examples of countries where Internet
banking is slowly being more accepted include Greece and
1Eurostat - Individuals using the Internet for Internet banking:
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/refreshTableAction.do;?pcode=
tin00099&language=en
Turkey (each 4% in 2007 and 11% in 2013). The trend is that
the use of online banking continues to grow in most countries.
With this relatively new type of banking comes a new type
of fraud. Instead of interacting directly with a bank (i.e. by
talking to an employee at a bank’s local ofﬁce), more and
more banking customers rely on electronic devices to create
wire transfers. Criminals follow suit. Instead of robbing a bank
directly (e.g. by threatening an employee or by breaking into a
vault), criminals that commit online banking fraud often focus
on deceiving customers instead.
Types of attacks that involve the customer can be distin-
guished by the actions of an adversary. There are imperson-
ation attacks, with which an adversary obtains authentication
information (such as user names, passwords and PIN codes) to
create malicious transactions. Impersonation attacks are char-
acterized by an adversary creating a new session with the bank
in name of (and thereby impersonating) the customer. Another
type is a man-in-the-middle attack, in which the adversary
injects information in an existing session between customer
and bank. With a successful man-in-the-middle attack, neither
the bank nor the customer notice any discrepancies when the
adversary makes sure that both parties in the session see what
they expect to see.
Man-in-the-middle attacks are often executed through the
computers of banking customers [1]. Redhead and Povey’s
(1998) work states that in the development of online banking
applications at the time, general attention was too strongly
focused on the issues of network security and not enough on
the security of the customer’s computer [2]. Their prediction
was that the developers of malware would use their skills for
ﬁnancial gain by targeting online banking, which they did.
Several banks are applying Customer Veriﬁed Transaction
Set Authentication (CVTSA) to prevent man-in-the-middle
attacks. With CVTSA, a bank receives transaction information
in an insecure way (either from the customer or an adversary)
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and applies a secure way to make a customer validate the
information it received. What You See Is What You Sign
(WYSIWYS) is used with CVTSA since the customer has
to sign information presented by the bank in a secure way.
Former empirical research concluded that 21% of online
banking customers do not spot signiﬁcant changes when com-
paring critical transaction values [3]. CVTSA leaves room for
improvement through the mitigation of insecure user behavior.
Our contribution is a new transaction authentication method
with the name Entered Single Transaction Authentication
(ESTA) which, like CVTSA, aims to prevent man-in-the-
middle attacks. With ESTA, a bank can make a distinction
between actions of a customer and those of an adversary.
What distinguishes ESTA from CVTSA is a new concept
which ESTA applies, named What You Enter Is What You
Sign (WYEIWYS). WYEIWYS adds data integrity to digital
information as soon as it is created (entered by a human).
When data integrity is added as early as possible, customers
do not need to verify information that the bank received to
detect man-in-the-middle attacks. We introduce ESTA using
our research platform, known as the Trusted Entry Pad (TEP).
In Section II, we give a high level view of three different
types of transaction authentication: the type that is currently
in widespread use (Traditional Transaction Authentication, or
TTA), a new type which is being introduced by several banks
(CVTSA) and our proposal (ESTA). We note an important
limitation of TTA and how CVTSA and ESTA solve this.
Finally, we note the difference between CVTSA and ESTA.
The following three sections contain use scenarios of each
transaction authentication type. Section III gives an example
of how a man-in-the-middle attack can be used to work around
the security offered by TTA. In Section IV, we explain how
CVTSA protects against man-in-the-middle attacks and note
how this requires additional attention from the customer com-
pared to TTA. How ESTA is used is noted in Section V. This
section also mentions how ESTA offers the same protection as
CVTSA without requiring additional attention or actions from
the customer during transaction authentication.
Related work to ESTA is noted in Section VI. This includes
comparisons with TTA and CVTSA-based authentication de-
vices. We also look at existing technology and concepts which
a potential ESTA implementation can use. Section VII follows
with possible directions for further research based on our work.
Finally, Section VIII contains our concluding remarks.
II. TRANSACTION AUTHENTICATION
Entity and transaction authentication in online banking each
apply to different actions initiated by a customer. Entity au-
thentication concerns the customer proving his or her identity
to the bank to initiate a new session. Transaction authentication
concerns the customer proving the authenticity of transaction
requests when the customer asks the bank to approve the
requests and create transactions based on them. We distinguish
three different types of authentication methods that relate to
transaction authentication.
A. Traditional transaction authentication (TTA)
TTA effectively re-applies entity authentication since it
misses or has a limited relation with transaction requests.
When a bank asks a customer to authenticate a transaction
request or a set of transaction requests, the necessary informa-
tion concerning the transactions is presented to the customer
on his or her computer. The computer owned by the customer
is a potential man-in-the-middle when it is compromised by
malware. When this happens, it cannot protect the information
ﬂow integrity from a customer to a bank and vice versa
by itself. An adversary can hide newly created illegitimate
transaction requests or change characteristics of requests made
by the customer before they are sent to the bank. When the
bank asks for authentication, the adversary only has to show
the original transaction requests to the customer. By hiding
the new or modiﬁed transaction requests, the customer has
no reason for suspicion and continues to authenticate the
transaction requests that he or she did not create using TTA.
More information on this ﬂaw in TTA is given in Section III.
B. Customer veriﬁed transaction set authentication (CVTSA)
Several banks implement new authentication methods that
allow customers to validate transaction requests received by
banks without relying on the customer’s computer for integrity
of information presented to the customer. We refer to these
methods as CVTSA. CVTSA applies the concept of What You
See Is What You Sign (WYSIWYS) when customers verify
(sign) information that can be interpreted in a single semantic
context. The information ﬂow of CVTSA is shown in Figure 1.
(1) (2)
(3)(4)
(5)
Fig. 1. The transaction information ﬂow in CVTSA methods. A secure device,
provided by the bank, is used to present transaction requests received by the
bank to the customer for authentication. Dashed lines represent information
ﬂows which are optionally forwarded by the traversed devices, depending on
the type of authentication device.
The customer enters one or more transaction requests in the
client computer (step 1), which are forwarded to the bank (step
2). The bank sends information concerning the transaction
requests cryptographically secured to the authentication device
in step 3, either through an out-of-band channel or through the
customer’s computer. The device veriﬁes the authenticity of
the received information (i.e. whether it was sent by the bank)
and presents transaction request information to the customer in
step 4. The customer must conﬁrm that the set of transaction
requests entered in step 1 is equal to the set received in step 4.
Accepting the transaction requests must only be done if there
are no discrepancies. Either the customer does nothing and
the transactions are rejected, or the acceptance or rejection is
communicated to the bank in step 5. This ﬁnal step varies
in the use of the authentication device and the customer’s
computer. One example is the use of a veriﬁcation code (sent
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earlier in step 4) to be entered in the customer’s computer.
Another example is the customer expressing acceptance or
rejection on the authentication device, which forwards the
customer’s decision to the bank either directly or through the
customer’s computer.
One problem of CVTSA is that it requires more attention
from the customer. Not only must the customer check whether
information is entered correctly in his or her computer. The
customer must also check the information which the bank re-
ceived. If the customer does not perform the check thoroughly,
fraud is still possible. A study of AlZomai et al. (2008) shows
that of the test participants, 79% successfully noticed account
numbers of which ﬁve out of eight digits were replaced in a
simulated attack on CVTSA [3]. While this percentage is quite
high, it must be noted that the use of the same authentication
method over a longer time span was not tested. The risk exists
that customers will trade-in security for usability. They can do
this by only looking for the validation code that is required
for authentication while ignoring the information concerning
transaction requests.
An example of the use of CVTSA is given in Section IV.
C. Entered single transaction authentication (ESTA)
We propose a minimalistic approach for transaction au-
thentication which we name ESTA. ’Minimalistic’ refers to
a minimum of complexity in both usability and technology.
Instead of applying WYSIWYS, we apply a new concept that
we name What You Enter Is What You Sign (WYEIWYS) for
ESTA. This concept is less complex in usability compared to
WYSIWYS as applied by CVTSA since the customer does not
have to verify data received by the bank. Technical complexity
is kept to a minimum by using standard technologies in a
simple design.
The information ﬂow of ESTA is shown in Figure 2.
(3)(2)(1)
(5) (4)
Fig. 2. The transaction information ﬂow of our proposed WYEIWYS-based
authentication method for single transaction requests.
ESTA was conceived using our research platform named
’Trusted Entry Pad’ (TEP), which represents a device with
a display, keypad, smart card slot and a connection to a
customer’s computer. A smart card is used for storing and
applying cryptographic resources. The customer enters one
critical value of a single transaction request into the TEP
(step 1). After the customer conﬁrms his or her entry, a digital
signature of the value is made. Both the value and the digital
signature are sent to the customer’s computer (step 2), which
forwards it to the bank (step 3). The bank checks whether the
received value and signature match and sends a conﬁrmation
back to the customer’s computer (step 4), which shows it to
the customer (step 5). The process is repeated for each critical
value necessary to complete the transaction request. Examples
of critical values include the destination account number (i.e.
where the money will go to) and the amount (i.e. how much
money will be removed from the customer’s account to be sent
to the destination account number).
An example of how ESTA can be applied to prevent the
manipulation of critical information is given in Section V.
III. TRADITIONAL TRANSACTION AUTHENTICATION
(TTA)
In this section, we clarify why the dependence on an un-
trusted device to provide information integrity is a shortcoming
of TTA. We also point out why aggregated data should not be
used as veriﬁcation information using the sum of a transaction
set as an example. First, we will give a scenario in which TTA
is used successfully. After that, we demonstrate an attack using
the same scenario in which a legitimate transaction is turned
into a fraudulent transaction.
Note that the scenario we give for TTA is not ﬁctional.
Several banks apply challenge-response authentication for
transaction authentication [1].
In the scenario, entity authentication already took place and
the customer is logged in the secure banking environment.
The customer is Alice (A). She wants to send money to both
Bob and Charlie, and creates two transaction requests in the
bank’s (B) online environment using her computer (C). The
critical values of the transaction requests are the destination
account number and the amount (respectively D1 and S1 for
Bob, and D2 and S2 for Charlie). After entry, the bank returns
an overview of all prepared transaction requests.
D1 = 123456789, S1 = 500
D2 = 987654321, S2 = 100
Sa =
∑
S1,2 = 600
(1) A → C : D1, S1 (7) B → C : Nb, Sa
(2) C → B : D1, S1 (8) C → A : Nb, Sa
(3) A → C : D2, S2 (9) A → T : PIN,Nb, Sa
(4) C → B : D2, S2 (10) T → A : EK{Nt, Nb, Sa}
(5) B → C : D1, S1, D2, S2 (11) A → C : EK{Nt, Nb, Sa}
(6) C → A : D1, S1, D2, S2 (12) C → B : EK{Nt, Nb, Sa}
Alice enters the critical values of each transaction request
in her computer, which sends it to the bank (steps 1 to 4). The
bank returns an overview of all entered transactions for Alice
to verify on her computer (steps 5 and 6).
Before the wire transfers are created, the bank authenticates
Alice’s transaction requests using challenge-response authen-
tication. Alice receives a random nonce generated by the bank
(Nb) and the rounded down total amount of all prepared
transaction requests (Sa) through her computer (steps 7 and 8).
These two values form the challenge. Sa is ﬁrst used by Alice
to verify that the total sum of all transactions as received by
the bank is the same total sum of the transaction requests she
entered in steps 1 and 3. After the veriﬁcation, Alice unlocks
the functionality of an electronic token (T ) using a Personal
Identiﬁcation Code (PIN ) and enters the challenge (step 9).
The token creates a response by encrypting the current time
stamp from its local clock (Nt) and the challenge with a
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symmetric key (K) that is only known to the token and the
bank. Alice enters the result in her computer, which in turns
sends the encrypted message to the bank (steps 10 to 12).
To verify the correctness of the transaction requests, the
bank must ﬁrst decrypt the received response using K. Of the
decrypted values, Nt and the current time must both be in
an accepted time frame to prevent replay attacks. Nb and Sa
must be equal to the challenge that was sent. If veriﬁcation
is successful, wire transfers are created for the transaction
requests that Alice made in steps 1 and 3.
Alice (A)
Bob
123456789
Alice's 
computer (C)
Bank 
computer (B)
Internet
Mallory (M)
321654987
D1: 123456789, S1:  € 500
D2: 987654321, S2: € 100
Sa: € 600
Charlie
987654321
D1': 321654987, S1:  € 500
D2: 987654321, S2: € 100
Sa: € 600
Token (T)
Information
Money
Legend of flows
Fig. 3. Alice fails to transfer money to Bob.
Mallory (M ) is a malicious adversary and has control over
Alice’s computer, as shown in Figure 3. Her goal is to gain
the money that is meant for Bob.
D′1 = 321654987
(1) A → C : D1, S1 (4) C → B : D2, S2
C → M : D1, S1 (5) B → C : D′1, S1, D2, S2
M → C : D′1 C → M : D′1, S1, D2, S2
(2) C → B : D′1, S1 M → C : D1
(3) A → C : D2, S2 (6) C → A : D1, S1, D2, S2
Before the destination account number and amount of the
ﬁrst transaction request are sent to the bank, Mallory replaces
the original destination account number D1 with account
number D′1, which is under her control (between steps 1
and 2). Mallory intervenes again when the bank sends the
transaction requests back to Alice’s computer for review. She
makes sure that Alice sees the transactions as she entered them
in her computer. The modiﬁed destination account number that
was sent to the bank is kept hidden from Alice due to Mallory’s
second intervention (between steps 5 and 6).
Alice proceeds with the challenge-response scheme, in
which Mallory does not have to intervene (steps 7 to 12).
Alice does not get suspicious when she checks Sa (the total
sum of all transaction requests) as part of the challenge in step
8 since it has not changed. S1 and S2 were not modiﬁed, and
therefore Sa stays the same. The attack is a success.
Mallory could also change both S1 and S2 for her beneﬁt in
a more advanced attack. She only needs to make sure that Sa
stays the same to avoid suspicion by Alice (e.g. S′1 as e 599
and S′2 as e 1), since Sa is part of the challenge. If Sa would
be changed, Alice would enter the wrong challenge in T (the
bank’s token), which creates an invalid response that will be
noticed by the bank.
The ﬂaw in the design of the used TTA method is that
the integrity of critical information provided by Alice was
not safeguarded, which allowed Mallory’s attack to succeed.
Alice’s computer acts as a man-in-the-middle, which allows it
to change unveriﬁed information between Alice and the bank.
The bank offers its customers the possibility to verify the
total sum that is received by the bank. Because this concerns
aggregated information (Sa in steps 7 and 8), the semantic
content of the message (the set of transaction requests from
steps 1 to 6) can be changed.
The example applied challenge-response authentication, but
an adversary also has the same opportunity if other multi-
factor authentication methods are used in which the integrity
of the customer’s input is not protected. This includes one-
time passwords and digital signatures over information which a
customer can only verify on the display of his or her computer.
We have explained why TTA does not protect the infor-
mation integrity of transaction requests between customer and
bank with this scenario. An opening for man-in-the-middle
attacks is present when a bank depends on a customer’s
computer for information veriﬁcation by a customer.
IV. CUSTOMER VERIFIED TRANSACTION SET
AUTHENTICATION (CVTSA)
In the previous section we have shown an example of a
legitimate banking session being turned into an illegitimate
session by a man-in-the-middle, represented by the banking
customer’s computer. In this section, we show an example of
how CVTSA methods that are currently being introduced by
banks cope with this. As noted in Section II, the concept of
WYSIWYS is applied by signing a set of transaction requests.
See Figure 1 on page 2 for an information ﬂow overview.
The start of the scenario is similar to the scenario given
in the previous section. We assume that some form of entity
authentication already took place. Alice (A) is ready to use her
computer (C) to transfer money from her account at her bank
(B) to both Bob and Charlie. The difference in this scenario
is that Alice now possesses a different authentication device
provided by the bank with the name ’Reader’ (R). Reader is an
electronic device with a relatively large display, a keypad and
a camera. It can be used to capture barcodes with information
sent by the bank through the display of Alice’s computer. The
information includes critical values of transaction requests and
the veriﬁcation code to be read by Alice from the display of
Reader. If Alice deems the transaction requests received by the
bank valid, she can enter the veriﬁcation code in her computer
to be forwarded to the bank.
(1) A → C : D1, S1
(2) C → B : D1, S1
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(3) A → C : D2, S2
(4) C → B : D2, S2
(5) B → C : D1, D2, S1, S2, EK{ H(D1, D2, S1, S2, N), N, V }
(6) C → R : D1, D2, S1, S2, EK{ H(D1, D2, S1, S2, N), N, V }
(7) R → A : D1, D2, S1, S2, V
(8) A → C : V
(9) C → B : V
Alice starts by entering the required transaction request
information in her computer, which forwards this to the bank
(steps 1 to 4). The bank returns a barcode, which contains a
message. The barcode is projected on the display of Alice’s
computer (step 5). The message contains both plain and cipher
text. The plain text part consists of destination account num-
bers (D1 and D2) and amounts (S1 and S2) of the transaction
requests. The cipher text EK{ H(D1, D2, S1, S2, N), N, V },
encrypted with shared secret key K 2, contains a digest (hash)
of the transaction requests’ critical values concatenated with
a nonce (H(D1, D2, S1, S2, N)), the nonce itself (N ) and a
veriﬁcation code (V ).
Alice uses her Reader to scan the code (step 6). The
Reader decrypts the cipher text information (digest, nonce and
veriﬁcation code) and creates a digest using the received plain
text information and the nonce. A check is made whether
the plain text was modiﬁed in-transit using the created and
received digests. If both are equal, the plain-text values were
not modiﬁed. In this example, the values are equal and
authentication can therefore continue. If this would not be
the case, the Reader would show an error and not allow
authentication to proceed.
The Reader shows the transaction requests as received by
the bank with a veriﬁcation code generated by the bank to
Alice (step 7). Alice checks whether the transaction requests
are as she entered them. If they are, she reads the veriﬁcation
code from the Reader and enters it in her computer (step 8).
The veriﬁcation code is then sent to the bank (step 9).
Where this scenario differs with TTA as applied in Sec-
tion III is that the bank relies on its own infrastructure to
provide integrity of information that must be veriﬁed by Alice.
The message in steps 5 and 6 only relies on Alice’s computer
to provide availability. While part of the message is plain text,
its integrity is protected by a mandatory check by the Reader
using the digest and nonce from the cipher text.
Mallory is again intervening. Her attack is similar to the
used approach in Section III.
(1) A → C : D1, S1
C → M : D1, S1
M → C : D′1
(2) C → B : D′1, S1
(3) A → C : D2, S2
(4) C → B : D2, S2
(5) B → C : D′1, D2, S1, S2, EK{ H(D′1, D2, S1, S2, N), N, V }
(6) C → R : D′1, D2, S1, S2, EK{ H(D′1, D2, S1, S2, N), N, V }
(7) R → A : D′1, D2, S1, S2, V
2For this scenario, we assume that symmetric encryption is used and that
secret key K is known by both B and R. An alternative would be the use
of asymmetric encryption in which B uses a public key and R a private key
from the same keypair.
Mallory changes the destination account number of the ﬁrst
transaction from D1 to D′1 between steps 1 and 2. It is not
possible for Mallory to change D′1 back to D1 between steps 5
and 6 without the Reader reporting an error, since she cannot
change the cipher text containing the information used to
verify the plain text values. Alice can see that D′1 is received
by the bank, which allows her to abort the authentication and
transaction requests by not entering the veriﬁcation code in
her computer.
This demonstrates both the strength and the weakness of
CVTSA. The customer has the opportunity to check whether
the bank received the correct information, unlike with TTA.
Unfortunately, nothing stops the customer from skipping this
check. The customer can just read the veriﬁcation code from
the display of the Reader and enter it in his or her computer
without taking a look at the transaction request information.
Humans cannot be treated as machines. They take actions
that may seem irrational, although they are perfectly justiﬁ-
able from cognitive and social perspectives. With CVTSA,
a customer can use validation information without paying
any attention to transaction request information. This nulliﬁes
the added security of CVTSA and therefore seems irrational,
but from cognitive and social perspectives it can make sense
because skipping the validation is the shortest and easiest route
to what the customer needs to accomplish (conduct payments).
V. ENTERED SINGLE TRANSACTION AUTHENTICATION
(ESTA)
We noted how TTA methods which depend on the cus-
tomer’s computer for information integrity are ﬂawed in Sec-
tion III. We also noted in Section IV how CVTSA mitigates
this ﬂaw by relying on the attention span of the customer. In
this section, we demonstrate how the use of What You Enter
is What You Sign (WYEIWYS) protects against session mod-
ifying attacks in a similar way to CVTSA without requiring
additional effort from the customer.
See Figure 2 on page 3 for an overview. Alice (A) again
wants to use her computer (C) to transfer money from her ac-
count at her Bank (B) to Bob and Charlie. The bank provided
her with a Trusted Entry Pad (TEP ) and a smart card (SC).
We also assume for this scenario that Alice is already logged in
the secure banking environment by previously applying entity
authentication. Therefore, the bank already knows that Alice
authenticated the session with her smart card.
(1) A → TEP : PIN
(2) TEP → SC : PIN
Alice starts the ﬁrst transaction request. Because this is
the ﬁrst use of the ’Pay’ function, her smart card must be
unlocked. She inserts her smart card in the TEP, chooses the
function ’Pay’ and enters her PIN on the device (step 1). The
TEP forwards the unlock request with the PIN to the smart
card (step 2). The PIN is valid and therefore the required
functionality is unlocked.
(3) A → TEP : D1
(4) TEP → SC : D1
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(5) SC → TEP : EPrK(SC){ H(SC,D1, Na), Na }
(6) TEP → C : D1, EPrK(SC){ H(SC,D1, Na), Na }
(7) C → B : D1, EPrK(SC){ H(SC,D1, Na), Na }
The ﬁrst transaction request Alice wants to enter is for Bob.
The TEP asks Alice to enter a destination account number for
the transaction request (D1). Alice enters this using the TEP’s
keypad and reads her entry on the TEP’s display while she
is typing. Any typographical mistakes can be corrected using
the keypad. Alice conﬁrms her entry with a push on the OK
button on the device (step 3). After Alice’s conﬁrmation, the
TEP sends D1 to the smart card (step 4).
A nonce (Na) is generated by the smart card. The
smart card concatenates its own identiﬁer SC, D1 (re-
ceived earlier from the TEP) and Na. A digest (hash)
is computed over the concatenated values, represented by
H(SC,D1, Na). The smart card encrypts the digest and nonce
with its private key PrK(SC) and returns encrypted message
EPrK(SC){ H(SC,D1, Na), Na } to the TEP (step 5).3 The
TEP sends both values (the destination account number in
plain text and the encrypted message) to Alice’s computer
(step 6), which forwards both to the bank (step 7).
(8) A → TEP : S1
(9) TEP → SC : S1
(10) SC → TEP : EPrK(SC){ H(SC,D1, S1, Nb), Nb }
(11) TEP → C : S1, EPrK(SC){ H(SC,D1, S1, Nb), Nb }
(12) C → B : S1, EPrK(SC){ H(SC,D1, S1, Nb), Nb }
The TEP asks for the next value, which is the amount of
money associated with the transaction (S1). Use of the TEP
by Alice and the communication between TEP and Alice’s
computer in steps 8 to 12 is similar to steps 3 to 7. Note that
the digest of the message is calculated over SC, D1, S1 and
the new nonce Nb.
The transaction request for Bob is now received by the bank.
For Charlie, Alice repeats steps 3 to 12 using Charlie’s account
number and the amount of money she wants to send to Charlie.
The bank performs an integrity check to determine whether
received messages are valid. This is done after each critical
transaction request value is received (after steps 7 and 12).
Before the integrity check is started, the bank decrypts the
signature using public key PuK(SC). The bank knows which
public key is appropriate based on earlier performed entity
authentication, which identiﬁed the smart card.
For the integrity check, the bank starts by computing a
digest. When a destination account number is received, the
digest is based on the known identiﬁer SC, the received D1
and nonce Na from step 7. When an amount is received,
the computed digest is based on the known identiﬁer SC,
the previously received (step 7) D1 and the received (step
12) plain text S1 and nonce Nb. This binds the amount
of the transaction to the destination account number and
3We apply asymmetric encryption in our example for information integrity
and non-repudiation. For conﬁdentiality, the data can in addition be encrypted
with a public key from B or with a symmetric key K shared by B and SC.
Alternatively, only symmetric encryption could be used to get conﬁdentiality
and integrity, but non-repudiation would be lost.
ensures that the messages from steps 7 and 12 cannot be
used independently. The message is valid if the digest of the
received message is equal to the digest that the bank computed.
Mallory (M ) is again an attacking party and has full control
over Alice’s computer. She can see that Alice is transferring
money to bank accounts of Bob an Charlie since D1, S1, D2
and S2 are forwarded as plain text by Alice’s computer from
TEP to bank.
(6) TEP → C : D1, EPrK(SC){ H(SC,D1, Na), Na }
C → M : D1, EPrK(SC){ H(SC,D1, Na), Na }
M → C : D′1
(7) C → B : D′1, EPrK(SC){ H(SC,D1, Na), Na }
It is possible for Mallory to change each plain text value
before it is sent to the bank (in this example, D1 to D′1 between
steps 6 and 7). This attack fails when the bank decrypts the
encrypted message and notices that the digest does not match
the received input. Alice is not allowed to continue.
(11) TEP → C : S1, EPrK(SC){ H(SC,D1, S1, Nb), Nb }
C → M : S1, EPrK(SC){ H(SC,D1, S1, Nb), Nb }
M → C : S′1
(12) C → B : S′1, EPrK(SC){ H(SC,D1, S1, Nb), Nb }
If Mallory would only change the amount instead (e.g. she
works together with Bob to get more money than Alice intents
to give), then the intervention would look as shown between
steps 11 and 12. Similar to the previous attack, the bank
notices that the signature does not match the received value
S′1 and will not allow the transaction to continue.
To summarize, applying ESTA protects against man-in-
the-middle attacks that modify critical transaction request
information in a customer’s session. This is similar to the
added information integrity of CVTSA when compared to
TTA, but differs in that the use of WYEIWYS does not intro-
duce a dependency on the customer to perform the required
validation, unlike WYSIWYS as applied by CVTSA.
VI. RELATED WORK
Several characteristics of the TEP are already represented
in existing authentication methods. We note several examples
and how they relate to the TEP.
A. Devices that apply keyboard emulation
Keyboard emulation can be used to transfer information
from one electronic device to another by applying a hardware
interface and a protocol used by keyboards (e.g. PS/2 or
USB HID). The receiving device does not require changes
to hardware or device drivers to facilitate the communication.
An example of an existing entity authentication device which
utilizes this is Yubico’s YubiKey [4].
We do not specify the interface between TEP and customer
computer (see Figure 2 on page 3, step 2) in this paper. Since
communication is modeled as unidirectional from TEP to the
customer’s computer, keyboard emulation can provide a soft-
ware independent bridge between these devices. In this case,
the implementation of client-side device drivers is unnecessary,
which is beneﬁcial for both banks (lower implementation
costs) and customers (less installation time).
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Transaction authentication Requires
Secure Veriﬁcation Data client-side
Type entry by user ﬂow software
Nordea TTA × × ↔ 
ABN-AMRO CVTSA ×  ↔ 
FINREAD CVTSA ×a b ↔ 
Radboud CVTSA ×  ↔ 
Rabobank CVTSA ×  ← ×
TEP ESTA  × → ×
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF INTERACTIVE SMART CARD TERMINALS.
a b Based on default use scenarios.
B. Interactive smart card terminals
This category includes devices which apply their own user
interface (keypad and display) while connected to a computer
and that depend on a smart card for cryptographic functions.
An overview of the discussed devices, their similarities and
their differences is given in Table I. We note two banks
from our former work that apply this to authenticate their
customers [1]. Nordea Bank (Nordic countries) allows its
corporate customers to connect their card reader to a client
computer using USB.4 The client can use the card reader
after software is installed (provided by the bank). Before
messages can be signed by the smart card, its functionality
must be unlocked by entering a PIN on the reader. Information
for the customer to sign is shown on his or her computer.
ABN-AMRO (the Netherlands) is a bank that uses a similar
card reader, named the E.Dentiﬁer2. This device differs from
Nordea’s card reader by showing information to sign on the
device itself instead of on the customer’s computer. An older
version of the E.Dentiﬁer2 authentication device had a notable
security ﬂaw, which was ﬁxed in a later version [5].
The FINREAD Card Reader is a bank independent example
[6]. It also features a smart card reader and a connection
to a customer’s computer. A difference with the previous
examples is that the reader itself also hosts cryptographic
credentials and functions together with user-installable ap-
plications from different providers. Communication between
reader and provider is secured in terms of conﬁdentiality and
integrity. One recognized weakness of FINREAD Card Reader
is the high cost required to produce the device [7, 8]. The
Radboud Reader is another interactive smart card terminal
[9], which by itself is less complex compared to FINREAD.
Complex functionality and control is instead moved to the
smart card.
Rabobank (the Netherlands) announced a new authentica-
tion device with the name Rabo Scanner.5 It allows one-way
communication without the installation of additional software
by displaying a color code on the customer’s computer, which
is scanned using a camera on the Rabo Scanner. The color
code contains the information to be veriﬁed, which is shown
on the display of the Rabo Scanner after it is scanned. For
4About Nordea’s card reader: http://www.nordea.com/Our+services/
International+products+and+services/Corporate+Netbank/Nordea+card+
reader/1079602.html
5Rabobank introduces the Rabo Scanner (Dutch): http://www.rabobank.nl/
particulieren/servicemenu/nieuws/rabobank nieuws/rabobank introduceert
de rabo scanner
conﬁrmation, the customer reads a veriﬁcation code from the
device and enters it in the bank’s site on his or her computer.
The TEP has a very minimalistic approach compared to the
other discussed authentication methods while still providing
the ability to verify and sign transaction requests separately
from the customer’s computer. It is not required for customers
to install client-side software. Unlike the CVTSA examples,
it is also not required for the customer to verify information
received by the bank. Instead, the process of protecting the
integrity of information is initiated by the customer and
completed by the bank, which does not require a round trip
of the same information for veriﬁcation.
C. Mobile devices used for out-of-band veriﬁcation
A customer owned smartphone and its connection to the
Internet can be used as an out-of-band channel to allow a
customer to verify information from a banking session with a
desktop computer.6 This can apply WYSIWYS if information
to sign can be interpreted in a single semantic context. Draw-
backs include the previously mentioned limitation of WYSI-
WYS (customers must perform additional actions adequately
for effective security), but also that the customer’s smartphone
is an untrusted device that is vulnerable to malware [10, 11].
ESTA can potentially be implemented on a smartphone,
with the caveat that the platform is not as trustworthy as a bank
provided device. While mobile applications can be hardened
against malware and other software-based threats7, malware
threats cannot be prevented in an untrusted environment.
D. Authentication solutions in trusted execution environments
A trusted execution environment (TEE) is a collection of
resources and controls of those resources that are physically
or logically separated from other resources on the same device
[12]. Such resources can include volatile memory space,
persistent storage space, CPU cycles, security functions and
different types of in- and output interfaces. Other resources
outside the TEE cannot interact with any of the resources that
compose the TEE unless explicitly permitted by the TEE. A
TEE can attest its identity and allows authorized remote parties
to interact with applications within the secure environment.
The principles of TEEs potentially allow the integration
of the TEP’s functions into a customer’s computer if it has
a TEE. Requirements of a TEE to host a TEP are that the
user knows whether he or she works within the normal or
the trusted environment and that in- and output interfaces are
secure against injection attacks.
VII. FURTHER RESEARCH
We give a high-level description of a security protocol in
Section V as an example of ESTA’s principles. This protocol
has not been formally tested against attacks. It can be vul-
nerable to existing attacks that were not considered and new
6An example of a software product which provides this is Entersekt’s online
banking authentication: http://www.entersekt.com/
7An example of a framework which allows mobile application hardening
is Versafe’s MobileSafe: http://www.versafe-login.com/?q=mobilesafe
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types of attacks. A further worked out technical deﬁnition of
the scheme and formal veriﬁcation can be used to determine
whether the protocol is secure.
While ESTA offers information integrity of transaction re-
quests between customer and bank by applying WYEIWYS, it
does not reduce the effectiveness of social engineering attacks
on the customer. Further research can answer what would be
required to protect against social engineering (e.g. phishing at-
tacks) in addition to the use of ESTA. It might be possible that
unambiguous labels for functions (e.g. ’Login’ and ’Pay’) and
requested information (e.g. ’Destination account number’ and
’Amount of money’) increases the awareness of customers.
This is something that can be tested in addition to the behavior
of customers when warnings are (repeatedly) observed (e.g.
’The use of this function WILL cost you money’).
The TEP is introduced as a technical concept to reduce
the effectiveness of malware attacks on banking customers’
computers. Injection attacks which add or replace ﬁnancial
transactions can be detected by protecting the integrity of the
information ﬂow between customer and bank. While we kept
the question about whether banking customers can use this
in the back of our minds, the technical concept has not been
tested for usability. It is possible that changes have to be made
to make WYEIWYS acceptable in everyday use. The use of
two input devices (a TEP for the entry of simple but critical
values and a regular keyboard for the entry of non-critical and
possibly more complex values) might confuse customers.
There are different possible approaches to implement
the unidirectional communication between TEP and the
customer’s computer. Comparing approaches and their
(dis)advantages would have to take the possible interfaces of
customer devices and their prerequisites for use into account.
Information to be entered in the TEP by the customer itself
can also present a challenge if the information next to digits
and a decimal separation character also contains letters. A
full destination account number can contain letters if it is an
International Bank Acccount Number (IBAN) [13]. A common
keypad might prove too cumbersome to enter letters. A full
keyboard can also present challenges regarding usability on a
small form factor. User input methods can be examined for the
best ﬁt between user entry and critical information to enter.
Also, the possibility of an increase in insecure user behavior
through typographical errors on an external device (ETSA) can
be compared against the possibility of insecure user behavior
when the user is required to compare values (CVTSA).
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we introduced Entered Single Transaction
Authentication using the Trusted Entry Pad, which applies the
new concept of What You Enter Is What You Sign to verify
customer entered data without the need for an extra veriﬁcation
step by the customer. It has a smaller margin for customer
errors compared to What You See Is What You Sign-based
approaches while still being independent from the customer’s
computer for information integrity, unlike traditional transac-
tion authentication methods.
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